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ABSTRACT
This study examines naturalization rates in the southeastern United States and compares them
to other regions while investigating some political consequences of naturalization. In terms of
the number of naturalized citizens and naturalization rates, the Southeast lags behind states
with long immigration histories. In all U.S. southeastern states, Asians comprise the largest
group of naturalized citizens, but rates vary. Mexicans and Central Americans are the least
likely to obtain citizenship in all southeastern states. The authors also find and discuss a small
immigrant presence in the U.S. House of Representatives and a significant positive correlation
between states’ naturalization rates and the percentage of the state that voted for Barack Obama
in the 2008 presidential election.
Key words: citizenship, naturalization, immigrants, politics
RESUMEN
El presente estudio examina las tasas de naturalización en el sureste de Estados Unidos y las
compara con las de otras regiones, mientras investiga algunas de sus consecuencias políticas. En
términos del número de ciudadanos naturalizados y de las tasas de naturalización, el sureste se
mantiene atrás de estados que tienen largas historias de inmigración. En todos los estados del
sureste estadunidense, los asiáticos tienen los mayores números de ciudadanos naturalizados,
aunque las tasas varían. Los mexicanos y los centroamericanos son quienes tienen menos proba-
bilidades de obtener la ciudadanía en los estados del sureste. Los autores también encuentran
y discuten la escasa presencia de inmigrantes en la Cámara de Representantes de Estados Unidos
y una correlación positiva significativa entre la tasa de naturalización de un estado y el porcen-
taje que votó por Barack Obama en la elección presidencial de 2008.
Palabras clave: ciudadanía, naturalización, inmigrantes, política
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INTRODUCTION
The process through which immigrants become citizens of their new homelands, the
extent to which they do so, and their roles in political life have become increasingly
important in sociological research and public debate recently. In 2010, the theme of
the American Sociological Association’s annual meeting was “Toward a Sociology
of Citizenship,” featuring panels exploring topics such as dual citizenship and immi-
grant inclusion, how immigrants become citizens in different countries, and migra-
tion and asylum-seeking as challenges to citizenship regimes. Earlier, important
work appeared on the social and political incorporation of immigrants, comparative
studies of naturalization, and the role of immigrants as citizens (or non-citizens)
in the political life of their new countries (Bloemraad, 2006a and 2006b; Castles
and Davidson, 2000; Joppke, 1999; Koopmans, Statham, et al., 2005; Plotke, 1999;
Schuck, 1998).
Outside academia, when the U.S. federal government revises policies affecting
immigrants (e.g., changes eligibility for receiving welfare,1 or constructs a wall along
the Mexican border) or if it hints at revising policies (e.g., calls for “comprehensive
immigration reform,” ponders ending “birthright” citizenship, or considers the
Dream Act),2 political activity by immigrants increases (e.g., lobbying legislators,
op-ed newspaper columns, and protest demonstrations), and naturalization rates
usually rise. At state and local levels, too, controversial attempts to deal with real or
alleged problems associated with foreign-born newcomers, such as recent laws aimed
at illegal immigrants in Arizona, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Georgia, or the 2009 ref-
erendum in Nashville on English as the official language, trigger political respons-
es and advocacy by immigrants, their children or descendants, and allies.
As the South, particularly the Southeast, has increasingly become an area of
settlement for recent immigrants, researchers have produced a growing body of lit-
erature on immigrants in this region (Ansley and Shefner, eds., 2009; Bankston, 2003;
Lippard and Gallagher, eds., 2010; Massey, ed., 2008; Mohl, 2003; Odem and Lacy,
eds., 2009; Zúñiga and Hernández-León, eds., 2005). However, this work rarely deals
with citizenship, naturalization, or political aspects of immigrants’ presence. There-
fore, we have two purposes in this article. The first is to compare the attainment of
U.S. citizenship by immigrants in southeastern states (and selected states in other
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1 As in the Welfare Reform Act of 1996 (see Van Hook, Brown, and Bean, 2006).
2 The full name of this proposed law is the Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors Act. If
passed, it would enable certain immigrants who entered the U.S. illegally as children and who graduate
from a U.S. high school to change their status to conditional permanent resident if they complete certain
requirements in either college or the military.
regions of the country), and the second is to uncover some political implications or
consequences of immigrant naturalization.
Regarding the first purpose, the data described below allow comparisons to be
made on the citizenship status of foreign-born Mexicans, Caribbeans, Central Amer-
icans, SouthAmericans, Asians, Europeans, and a residual “Other” category. Separate
comparisons of these groups are done by decade of entry into the United States. In
this part of the article, we address two questions: 1) Which southeastern states have
the highest and lowest numbers and percentages of naturalized U.S. citizens, and
how do they compare with the U.S. as a whole and selected northern and western
states?; and 2) In the Southeast, do immigrants from different parts of the world dif-
fer in their numbers and naturalization rates, and are the same patterns found in
other states?
Secondly, we want to help shift analysis of immigrant naturalization in a dif-
ferent direction. Many researchers investigating immigrant naturalization focus on
factors that encourage or discourage it (see literature review). Other scholars inter-
ested in the political inclusion or exclusion of immigrants pay relatively little attention
to naturalization, perhaps thinking that “issues about the naturalization process, in-
cluding rates of naturalization among immigrants from various countries, are analyt-
ically distinct from the question of how new citizens are incorporated into politics”
(Plotke, 1999: 297). So, rather than asking why some states or foreign-born nation-
alities have high or low rates of naturalization, and rather than assuming that natu-
ralization numbers or rates have little bearing on immigrant political incorporation,
our second goal is to contribute to the search to discover what –if any– consequen-
ces the number or rate of naturalized citizens have in U.S. politics.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Research on citizenship and naturalization has concentrated on three main areas.
First, studies explore socioeconomic and demographic predictors of immigrants’
propensity to naturalize (Bloemraad, 2006a and 2006b; Bueker, 2006; Clark, 2003;
DeSipio, 1987; Gilbertson and Singer, 2000; Liang, 1994; Portes and Curtis, 1987; Portes
and Rumbaut, 2006; Van Hook, Brown, and Bean, 2006; Yang, 1994). Second, research
has examined how structural factors, the context of reception, and host country
policies affect naturalization, sometimes comparing these factors across countries
(Bloemraad, 2006a and 2006b; Bueker, 2006; Castaneda, 2006; Fujiwara, 2008; Portes
and Rumbaut, 2006; Van Hook, Brown, and Bean, 2006; Yang, 1994). Third, several
studies analyze the political incorporation and participation of immigrants (Bass
181
CITIZENSHIP AND NATURALIZATION PATTERNS
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES
182
CHARLES JARET AND ORSOLYA KOLOZSVARI-WRIGHT
NORTEAMÉRICA
and Casper, 2001; Castaneda, 2006; Cho, 1999; Clark, 2003; Leal, 2002; Lien, 1994;
Lien, Collet, et al., 2001).
Examining socioeconomic and demographic predictors of naturalization has
been a major line of citizenship research. Previous research has found that a higher
education, a professional occupation, higher income, speaking English fluently,
being middle-aged, being married, having children, being a homeowner, having a
homeland that is far away, and rarely visiting the homeland boost immigrants’ pro-
pensity to naturalize (Bass and Casper, 2001; Bloemraad, 2006a and 2006b; Bueker,
2006; Clark, 2003; DeSipio, 1987; Gilbertson and Singer, 2000; Liang, 1994; Portes
and Curtis, 1987; Portes and Rumbaut, 2006; Van Hook, Brown, and Bean, 2006;
Yang, 1994). These factors have been used to explain why Mexicans are the least
prone to naturalize, and Asians and Europeans are more inclined to do so.
The country of origin matters in several ways. A homeland fraught with eco-
nomic battles, curtailed freedoms, or religious or political persecution raises the in-
centives for immigrants and refugees to seek citizenship in the host country.
Furthermore, whether or not the country of origin allows dual citizenship is a cru-
cial consideration for immigrants (Bloemraad, 2006a and 2006b; Clark, 2003; Gil-
bertson and Singer, 2000; Portes and Rumbaut, 2006; Yang, 1994). The possibility of
dual citizenship illustrates the many factors immigrants weigh as they assess the
costs and benefits of naturalization. In the United States naturalization tends to be
a long and costly process, and for some immigrants the benefits of citizenship do not
surpass these costs (Dodoo and Pinon, 1994).
Structural factors and social policies in a host country also affect immigrants’
propensity to naturalize. For instance, the Welfare ReformAct of 1996, which limit-
ed numerous public benefits to citizens and excluded permanent resident aliens,
escalated naturalization rates in the United States (Bueker, 2006; Castaneda, 2006;
Fujiwara, 2008; Gilbertson and Singer, 2000; Van Hook, Brown, and Bean, 2006). Other
countries, such as Canada, have higher naturalization rates than the U.S., which
Bloemraad (2006a and 2006b) attributes to their different policies. Canada has a
shorter residency requirement and an easier, faster naturalization process than the
United States; moreover, it has implemented policies and programs that prepare
immigrants for naturalization.
Research exploring the political participation of naturalized immigrants finds
they have lower rates of political activity than native-born citizens, although there
are some exceptions. Immigrants fromAsia and LatinAmerica are not homogenous
in their political participation; naturalized citizens from some of these countries
show higher political activity than others. Naturalized immigrants with high edu-
cational levels or income, professional occupations, long residence at their current
U.S. address, and are older and fluent in English (e.g., Europeans, Asians of sever-
al nations, such as Japan and Korea, as well as Cubans) are more likely to vote than
those without these characteristics (e.g., Mexicans or Dominicans [Bass and Cas-
per, 2001; Castaneda, 2006; Cho, 1999; Clark, 2003; Leal, 2002; Lien, 1994; Lien, Collet,
et al., 2001]). However, socioeconomic and demographic characteristics alone do
not determine rates of political participation; they also depend on the level of polit-
ical socialization (Cho, 1999). In addition, it is important to understand that natu-
ralization does not necessarily result in political participation; being naturalized and
registered, together with the other aforementioned factors is a better predictor of
voting patterns and other forms of political involvement (Bass and Casper, 2001;
Castaneda, 2006; Cho, 1999; Clark, 2003; Lien, 1994; Lien, Collet, et al., 2001).
As is apparent from the review of previous research, prior studies have focused
on the United States as a whole, and up to now research on citizenship has not
explored naturalization trends in different areas within the United States. Our study
helps fill this gap in the literature by comparing naturalization rates in southeast-
ern states to other states and regions of the U.S. Given recent political debates on
immigration and the growing number of immigrants who become potential voters
upon naturalization, it is useful to examine naturalization patterns in various parts
of the country, since over time naturalized immigrants may have the capacity to
alter the U.S. political landscape.
Based on findings in prior literature, we formulated three main hypotheses.
First, we expect Florida to have higher naturalization rates than Georgia, Tennes-
see, and North and South Carolina, because Florida’s immigrants have been in the
United States longer and because many of Florida’s immigrants, especially Cubans,
are at least middle-aged and have relatively high educational levels and income.
Since recent immigrants in Georgia, North and South Carolina, and Tennessee are
less likely to possess the same characteristics, we expect them to have lower natu-
ralization rates. Similarly, we hypothesize that the Southeast as a whole has lower
naturalization rates than the West and Northeast.
Second, since, on average, Asian and European immigrants have higher edu-
cational levels, income, and rates of homeownership, and their homelands are far
from the U.S., we expect them to have the highest naturalization rates. We also hypoth-
esize that Mexicans and Central Americans have the lowest naturalization rates
because of their nearby homelands and relative lack of the characteristics mentioned
above. We expect SouthAmericans, Caribbeans, and the category “Other” to be in the
middle in terms of naturalization rates, both in the Southeast and elsewhere.
Third, we hypothesize that the percentage of naturalized citizens in a state does
affect politics, and that states with a sizable (and actively voting) naturalized immi-
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grant population might move in a direction that favors Democratic candidates
more than Republicans.
DATA AND RESEARCH METHOD
Data for this article are from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2006-2008 American Com-
munity Survey (ACS). Specifically, Table B05007 (accessed on the Census Bureau’s
website), shows the citizenship status (naturalized U.S. citizen or non-U.S. citizen)
of the foreign-born population residing in each state of the U.S., subdivided by
entry year cohort of people born in six different regions of the world. The four entry
year cohorts designated in the ACS data are: “entered 2000 or later,” “entered 1990
to 1999,” “entered 1980 to 1989,” and “entered before 1980” (this refers to the year
they entered the United States, not the year they entered their state of residence at
the time of the 2006-2008 ACS). Since a substantial percentage of people in the most
recent entry cohort has not lived in the U.S. long enough to meet the residency
requirement or complete the naturalization process, the post-2000 cohort has the
lowest percentage of naturalized citizens, and the percentage of naturalized citizens
increases steadily among entry cohorts with longer tenure in the country. In addi-
tion, the ACS shows the citizenship status for people in each entry cohort from six
separate areas of the world (people born in Europe, Asia, the Caribbean, Mexico,
Central America, South America, and a residual “Other” category). Thus, while we
would prefer to compare and report naturalization rates for immigrants from spe-
cific countries (e.g., Korea, Vietnam, Jamaica, Haiti, etc.), it is not possible due to the
way the Census Bureau has aggregated the data and presents it in the ACS table.
The central variable in this study is the percentage of the foreign-born popula-
tion that has become naturalized U.S. citizens. We refer to this percentage as the
“percent naturalized” or as the “naturalization rate,” interchangeably. We have
computed the percent naturalized for the U.S. as a whole, for individual states, and
for subsets of states, and done so for the foreign-born populations from the differ-
ent parts of the world and the four entry cohorts.
To assist and clarify interpretation of different states’ or different groups’ nat-
uralization rates, we also utilize “standardization” (based on U.S. entry cohorts).
This is a statistical technique that enables a researcher to take into account (control
for) compositional differences between two or more groups being compared. In this
case, we standardize to control for differences between Europeans,Asians, Caribbeans,
Mexicans, etc. in terms of their percentages in the four U.S. entry cohorts (arrived
since 2000; arrived 1990-1999; arrived 1980-1989; arrived pre-1980). Obviously, a
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group or a state that has a very large percentage of immigrants that entered in the
post-2000 cohort will have a lower percent naturalized (other things being equal)
than a group or state with many immigrants who entered in the 1980s or earlier.
The standardization procedure used here eliminates the differences in group’s and
state’s entry cohort composition by taking each group’s actual naturalization rate
in each entry cohort and multiplying those rates by a standard set of percentages in
each entry cohort. Specifically, we chose to use the Georgia Asian percentages of
foreign-born residents in the four entry cohorts as the standard, and applied each
states’/groups’ own entry cohort naturalization rates to that standard.3 These cohort
entry percentages and the naturalization rates for each entry cohort are shown, for
selected states, in Table 2. The results of the standardization procedure appear in
Table 3; they indicate what the naturalization rate would be for each state’s immi-
grant groups from different parts of the world if they had the same distribution
across entry cohorts as Georgia’s foreign-born Asians have. They reflect the effect
of real differences in naturalization rates (i.e., proclivity and ability to successfully
naturalize) among immigrant groups after taking away differences in the timing of
their entry into the U.S. Disparities between these hypothetical naturalization per-
centages (in Table 3) and the actual naturalization percentages in Table 1 also allow
us to see how large an impact groups’ or states’ differences in entry cohorts makes
on naturalization rates. For example, Table 1 shows that for the whole U.S., the Ca-
ribbean percent naturalized is 54.0, but after entry cohort standardization, its per-
cent naturalized declines to 44.7. This means a substantial part of Caribbeans’
actual naturalization rate (nearly as high asAsians’) is due to their being in the U.S.,
on average, longer than Georgia’s Asians; if, hypothetically, they had the same entry
cohort percentages as Georgia’s Asians and retained the Caribbean naturalization
rates in each entry cohort, then their naturalization rate would be 10 percentage
points lower than it actually is (well below that of Asians). In contrast, Mexicans’
actual and standardized naturalization rates for the U.S. as a whole (Tables 1 and 3)
hardly differ, implying that their relatively low naturalization rate cannot be attrib-
uted to them being more recent immigrants than Georgia’s Asians.
We use least squares multiple regression analysis to investigate the relation-
ship between states’ naturalization rates and the percentage of voters who cast their
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3 Selecting which group to use as the standard is an arbitrary choice. We chose Georgia Asians because they
are average in terms of their distribution in entry cohort categories (neither the most recent nor the “oldest”
immigrant group) and because in size they are neither the largest nor the smallest immigrant group in the
Southeast. As a check, we also compared these results to those obtained using other standards (e.g., per-
cents in entry cohorts of all Europeans in the U.S., all Mexicans in the U.S., and Caribbeans in Florida).
The agreement of these alternative standardized naturalization rates is extremely high, with correlations
among them of .95 or higher.
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ballots for Barack Obama in the 2008 presidential election. Since there are only 50
states (plus Washington, D.C.), only a few other variables can be used in the regres-
sion equation to see and control for their effect. In addition to the state’s naturaliza-
tion rate, we chose to use the percentage of blacks in the state population, whether
the state is in the South or not (South coded 1, non-South coded 0), the state median
household income, and the percentage of the state’s population that is foreign-born.
All data come from the American Community Survey, except the percentage voting
for Obama, which came from the Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections (Leip, 2008).
We note three limitations relevant for understanding the meaning of the natu-
ralization data. First, except for people in the “entered 2000 or later” cohort, we can-
not tell from this ACS data set when (i.e., which decade) people became naturalized
citizens. Since the ACS tables do not specify the year of naturalization, we cannot
determine, for example, the percentages of people in the 1980-1989 entry cohort who
naturalized in the 1980s, 1990s, or the 2000s, and, therefore, we cannot link changes
in naturalization rates to specific political or economic events (e.g., IRCA, California’s
Proposition 187, or other anti-immigrant laws).
Second, although the ACS data are organized by state of residence, this does not
mean that all the naturalized citizens residing in a given state when they were sur-
veyed by the ACS did their naturalization while living in that state. Some (an un-
known percentage) were naturalized in other states and subsequently moved to the
state where they were surveyed in the 2006-2008 ACS. This means, for example, that
although a higher percentage of Asians in Florida (57.8 percent) are naturalized cit-
izens than of Asians living in Georgia (48.7 percent) and North Carolina (48.0 per-
cent), we should be cautious about assuming that conditions in Florida are especially
conducive to encouragingAsians living there to naturalize, since we do not have evi-
dence about how many Asians actually lived in Florida when they decided to start
the naturalization process or when they actually completed it.
Third, these data are based on the ACS’s sampling design, and for some of the
smaller foreign-born regional categories and entry cohorts the standard errors –“mar-
gin of error” in ACS terminology– are rather large; so some estimates of the percentage
naturalized provided by the ACS are rough and not very accurate.4 Therefore, in this
4 For example, South Carolina’s number of Central Americans who entered the U.S. between 1990 and 1999
and are naturalized U.S. citizens is relatively small (estimated at 668 in the ACS), and these naturalized
Central Americans comprise 17.6 percent of South Carolina’s Central Americans in that entry cohort. But
after taking sampling errors into account by applying the ACS’s “margin of error,” we see the lack of preci-
sion: 90 percent confident that the percent naturalized among Central Americans in South Carolina who
entered between 1990 and 1999 is a number between 9.3 percent and 25.8 percent. In contrast, Florida has
a much larger population of CentralAmericans of that same entry cohort (estimated at 87 669). The ACS sample
based on them shows 20.9 percent are naturalized U.S. citizens, and a much narrower “margin of error”
article, we emphasize naturalization percentages for foreign-born regional catego-
ries and entry cohorts large enough to serve as the basis of relatively more accurate
estimates.
Despite these limitations, these ACS data are valuable and appropriate for our
research goals. They provide useful estimates of the numbers and percentages of nat-
uralized U.S. citizens in the southeastern states and enable comparisons with other
states as well as comparisons of the differences in naturalization rates among groups
from different parts of the world. The ability to analyze naturalization rates by entry
cohort, which this data source allows, is very valuable since the states and the for-
eign-born groups studied here vary greatly on this important factor.
We define the Southeast narrowly in this study, limiting it to Georgia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. Florida, obviously, is geographically in the
Southeast, but its immigration history differs so greatly from other southeastern states
that including it with the other four states would distort the picture more than clar-
ify it. Similarly, we found that the northern edge of the South Atlantic census divi-
sion (Virginia, D.C., Maryland, and Delaware) has a pattern distinct enough that it
makes sense to keep it separate in our analysis. As for Alabama andMississippi, we
drop them from the analysis because their numbers of immigrants frommost world
regions and entry cohorts are small, which generates large standard errors and esti-
mates of dubious value.
FINDINGS
Our findings are presented in the following order: 1) Which southeastern states
have the highest and lowest numbers and percentages of naturalized US citizens,
and how do they compare with the U.S. as a whole and selected northern and west-
ern states?; 2) How do immigrants in the Southeast from different parts of the world
compare in numbers and rates of naturalization, and are the same patterns found
in other states?; and 3) Is there evidence suggesting that the number or percentage
of naturalized citizens affects U.S. politics in an important way?
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indicates we can be more confident of it: 90 percent sure that the naturalization rate of Central Americans
living in Florida from the 1990-1999 entry cohort is a number between 18.7 percent and 23.1 percent.
NATURALIZATION NUMBERS
AND RATES IN SOUTHEASTERN STATES
First, we examined which southeastern states have the highest and lowest numbers
and percentages of immigrant U.S. citizens (see Table 1). In terms of numbers of
naturalized citizens in the four southeastern states, Georgia has by far the highest
number of immigrants who have obtained citizenship (288 180). North Carolina
also has a relatively high number (175 751). The number of naturalized citizens,
however, is much lower in Tennessee and South Carolina (78 633 and 63 226, res-
pectively). In recent years, Georgia and North Carolina have become popular des-
tinations for immigrants and now have many immigrants who have attained or are
seeking U.S. citizenship.
The number of naturalized immigrants in Georgia and North Carolina, how-
ever, is dwarfed by the number observed in Florida (1 564 911). Florida, a state with
a rich and long immigration history, has more than five times the number of natu-
ralized immigrants than Georgia and more than eight times that of than North Caro-
lina. Also, states on the northern tip of the South Atlantic division, such as Virginia
and Maryland, have higher numbers of naturalized citizens than the four south-
eastern states. The number of naturalized citizens is higher in almost all comparison
states in the West, Northeast, and Midwest than in the Southeast. For example, (in
descending order) California, NewYork, Texas, New Jersey, and Illinois all havemuch
higher numbers of naturalized citizens than the Southeast; and while Arizona,
Michigan, and Nevada do not surpass Georgia, they do exceed the other three
southeastern states.
In terms of the percentage of foreign-born residents who have become natural-
ized citizens, there is less difference among southeastern states than in terms of the
number of naturalized immigrants. In the Southeast, the highest naturalization rate
for foreign-born residents is in South Carolina and Georgia (33.9 percent and 33.0
percent, respectively). Tennessee has a naturalization rate of 32 percent and North
Carolina, 28.2 percent. North Carolina has the lowest percentage of naturalized cit-
izens not only in the Southeast, but among all states we observed. Again, southern
states with a longer and different immigration history, such as Florida, Maryland,
and Virginia have higher naturalization rates than Georgia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Tennessee (46 percent; 45.2 percent; and 43.7 percent, respectively).
A comparison of the Southeast in terms of naturalization rates with states in
the West, Northeast, and Midwest yields a slightly more complicated picture than
comparing the numbers of immigrants who have obtained citizenship. States with
a long history of hosting European and Asian immigrants, such as New York, New
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Table 1
NUMBER OF NATURALIZED U.S. CITIZENS AND PERCENTAGES
OF FOREIGN-BORN WHO ARE NATURALIZED U.S. CITIZENS (NATURALIZATION RATES)
FOR SELECTED GROUPS IN THE SOUTHEAST AND OTHER STATES (2006-2008)
Total Asian European Caribbean Mexican Central Am. South Am. Other
U.S. Total
# Rate 16 028 758 5 781 156 2 999 702 1 822 960 2 509 324 810 282 1 072 537 1 032 797
(percent) 42.5 57.1 60.2 54.0 21.9 30.0 42.0 42.0
Georgia 288 180 104 856 43 516 43 088 26 466 13 209 20,028 37 017
33.0 48.9 48.2 58.6 9.7 18.0 34.5 40.7
North Carolina 175 751 61 892 37 947 12 038 18 382 12 904 12 830 19 758
28.2 48.0 52.0 50.2 7.5 20.4 37.4 36.9
South Carolina 63 226 21 296 19 379 4 100 5 203 2 718 4 844 5 686
33.9 52.5 51.0 57.4 8.9 19.3 35.3 39.3
Tennessee 78 633 33 438 18 448 3 739 6 884 3 850 2 725 9 549
32.0 48.0 54.9 52.0 8.9 17.8 33.7 33.4
Florida 1 564 911 191 522 222,494 704 283 42,470 101 629 226 900 75 613
46.0 57.8 58.3 53.6 14.6 32.1 38.5 42.2
Virginia 342 919 180 305 50 967 14 849 8 481 26 760 26 558 34 999
43.7 57.3 51.9 55.5 14.9 21.5 35.5 39.8
Maryland 312 449 129 142 54 248 31 546 4 967 24 172 21 868 46 476
45.2 56.8 60.2 54.5 15.0 22.2 41.8 38.2
New York 2 187 819 585 897 552 809 562 516 26 123 83 196 286 051 91 227
51.9 54.2 66.3 54.6 11.2 35.0 49.3 41.3
New Jersey 853 898 285 416 214 885 145 572 12 276 31 242 117 384 47 123
49.8 54.9 66.6 56.3 10.4 26.8 41.3 49.2
Illinois 780 703 254 932 246 383 17 851 188 237 20 153 25 218 27 929
44.3 58.3 60.0 66.9 26.3 40.6 45.9 40.3
Michigan 284 808 131 122 90 890 5 447 16 800 3 494 5 715 31 340
47.9 51.9 60.2 48.6 19.7 26.9 50.4 44.5
California 4 317 495 2 123 054 411 665 46 492 1 138 693 290 801 125 799 180 991
43.8 63.0 60.7 67.9 26.3 35.7 51.1 51.3
Arizona 284 472 67 074 54 292 4 012 121 673 8 343 8 947 20 131
30.1 54.2 60.2 45.2 19.7 28.3 52.7 34.5
Nevada 180 151 71 910 24 298 7 386 47 487 11 462 6 354 11 254
37.2 60.3 55.8 50.8 20.6 30.4 47.1 43.5
Texas 1 173 139 340,753 85 919 28 510 540 753 71 670 39 709 65 825
31.0 54.3 51.0 54.0 22.9 23.8 36.8 39.3
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2006-2008 American Community Survey (ACS), table B05007.
Jersey, Illinois, Michigan, and California have much higher naturalization rates than
the Southeast (with naturalization rates ranging from 43.8 percent in California to
51.9 percent in New York). Arizona and Texas, however, have total naturalization
rates similar to those in the Southeast (around 30-31 percent). These relatively low
naturalization rates might partly be due to the proximity of Texas and Arizona to
the Mexican border, the easy reversibility of migration, and possibly a larger per-
centage of undocumented migrants in the Southwest who are not eligible for citizen-
ship. However, the similar total naturalization rates of southwestern and southeastern
states conceal remarkable differences in the naturalization rates of different groups
within these regions. For example, Mexicans and Central Americans have higher
rates of naturalization in Texas andArizona, as do South Americans in Arizona, than
in the four southeastern states; this is most likely because these groups have been
present for a longer period of time in the Southwest than the Southeast.
The naturalization rates (i.e., percentage of foreign-born that have become nat-
uralized U.S. citizens) mentioned here should not be confused with the percentage
of a state’s total population made up of naturalized citizens. In Georgia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee naturalized foreign-born U.S. citizens are
still a tiny fraction of the state’s total population: 3.0 percent, 1.9 percent, 1.4 per-
cent, and 1.3 percent, respectively. In contrast, they comprise 8.7 percent of Florida’s
total population, 5.6 percent in Maryland, 4.5 percent in Virginia, and larger per-
centages in many northern and western states (e.g., 11.9 percent in California, 11.3
percent in New York, 9.9 percent in New Jersey, and 9.5 percent in Hawaii).
NATURALIZATION NUMBERS AND RATES FOR
DIFFERENT IMMIGRANT GROUPS IN THE SOUTHEAST
Naturalization Numbers
Given the greater attention the media and many researchers place on Mexican rather
than Asian immigrants, our results may surprise people. As table 1 shows, in Geor-
gia, Asians have by far the largest number of naturalized U.S. citizens (104 856),
even though considerably more foreign-born Mexicans thanAsians live in the state.
In fact, Asian naturalized citizens in Georgia are more than twice as numerous as
each of Georgia’s next largest groups of naturalized citizens (Europeans, Carib-
beans, and Others). Mexicans, South Americans, and Central Americans make up
Georgia’s smallest number of naturalized citizens, and even when added together,
they are much fewer in number than Georgia’s naturalized Asian immigrants. A
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slightly different rank order exists in North Carolina and Tennessee (Asians,
Europeans, Others, and Mexicans); while in South Carolina, Asians and Europeans
are about equal in number and together comprise almost 65 percent of South
Carolina’s naturalized citizens, with the remainder split equally among the remain-
ing regional categories.
These four southeastern states contrast much more sharply with Florida, home
to more than 700 000 naturalized immigrants from Caribbean countries, more than
triple the number of the next two largest groups: South Americans (226 900) and
Europeans (222 494). Whereas in Georgia, North Carolina, and Tennessee, Asians
were the largest set of naturalized citizens, in Florida, Asians are fourth largest, fol-
lowed by Central Americans, Others, and Mexicans.
Asian naturalized citizens also numerically predominate by a wide margin in
the upper southern states of Virginia (180 305) and Maryland (129 142). European
naturalized citizens are a distant second in these states, but what is perhaps most
distinctive about Virginia and Maryland is that the “Others” are the third largest
number of naturalized citizens, probably due to the large, well-established African
immigrant communities in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. The lower num-
bers of naturalized Mexican and Caribbean immigrants also distinguishes Virginia
and Maryland from Georgia.
In numbers of naturalized U.S. citizens from different parts of the world,
northern and western states differ from southeastern states mainly in that Asians
are not as predominant numerically. As Table 1 shows, in New York, New Jersey,
and Illinois, naturalized Europeans are almost as numerous as Asians; in Texas and
Arizona naturalized Mexicans outnumber naturalized Asians.
Naturalization Rates
How do immigrants from different parts of the world and currently residing in south-
eastern states compare in their rates of naturalization? In Georgia, we find a surpris-
ing answer to this question (Table 1, bold numbers): foreign-born residents from
Caribbean countries have Georgia’s highest naturalization rate (58.6 percent).
Georgia’s immigrants from Asia (48.9 percent) and Europe (48.2 percent) are next
highest, while immigrants from South America (34.5 percent), Central America
(18.0 percent), and Mexico (9.7 percent) have the lowest naturalization rates. In
Georgia, foreign-born from “Other” countries are in the middle of the distribution,
with a naturalization rate of 40.7 percent. The relative uniqueness of Caribbeans in
Georgia is evident in Table 1, which shows that among Caribbeans, the percentage
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naturalized in Georgia is higher than the U.S. as a whole and almost all other states
in the table. In South Carolina, like Georgia, Caribbean immigrants have the high-
est naturalization rate, followed by Asians and Europeans; but North Carolina,
Tennessee, Florida, Maryland, and Virginia all differ, with either immigrants from
Europe or Asia having the highest naturalization rates.
As expected, Mexican immigrants have very low naturalization rates in Geor-
gia (9.7 percent) and other states in the Southeast (all under 10 percent). All other
states in Table 1 (and the U.S. as a whole) show Mexicans with the lowest naturaliza-
tion rates, albeit their rates do run higher in states outside the Southeast (especially
California, Illinois, and Texas). Central Americans have the next lowest natural-
ization rates (ranging from about 18 percent to 20 percent in the Southeast), while
South Americans and “Other” immigrants’ rates are typically close to each other,
but well above those of Mexicans and Central Americans.
In sum, we find Georgia and the other southeastern states have relatively low
rates of naturalization for most immigrant groups, except for Caribbean immigrants
(especially in Georgia and South Carolina, where they are above average) and
“Other” immigrants. This result is not unexpected, given that immigrants in the
South tend to have entered the U.S. more recently than those in other regions, and
since little or no tradition exists of recruiting immigrants into, or mobilizing them
for, political processes.
Of course, the percentage of an immigrant group that naturalizes is strongly
affected by how long the group’s members have lived in the U.S. One reason Mex-
icans’ and Central Americans’ naturalization rates are so low is that relatively large
percentages of them have entered the country since 2000. For example, in Georgia
47.9 percent of Mexicans and 44.8 percent of Central Americans came to the U.S. in
2000 or more recently, compared to 17.7 percent of Caribbeans and 26.2 percent of
Europeans (see Table 2), and this most recent entry cohort has by far the lowest rate
of naturalization for all groups (shown in Table 2, italicized numbers). By using the
statistical standardization procedure described above, we compare groups’ natu-
ralization rates controlling for their differences in percentages in each entry cohort.
Results of the standardization procedure, shown in Table 3, lead to reinterpre-
tation of some Table 1 findings described above. For instance, after standardization,
North Carolina no longer has the lowest naturalization rate; Arizona and Texas do.
Also, the northern states, as well as border states like Maryland and Virginia, still
have higher naturalization rates than the southeastern states, but results in Table 3
show that this differential is not as large after controlling for differences in size of entry
cohorts. Taking the nation as a whole, entry cohort standardization reveals that
Europeans rank highest on percent naturalized in Table 1 because they have more
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Table 2
PERCENTAGES OF IMMIGRANTS IN EACH ENTRY COHORT (UPPER NUMBER)
AND PERCENTAGE OF IMMIGRANTS IN ENTRY COHORTS WHO ARE NATURALIZED
U.S. CITIZENS (LOWER NUMBER, IN ITALICS) (BY STATE)
Cohorts of Entry into the U.S.
Region of Birth Since 2000 1990-1999 1980-1989 Before 1980
Georgia
Asia 29.9 34.0 21.5 14.6
11.7 49.0 74.0 88.4
Europe 26.2 32.0 12.6 29.2
14.2 45.0 58.8 77.7
Caribbean 17.7 28.5 26.2 27.6
14.4 47.6 72.5 84.9
South America 41.6 29.8 16.8 11.9
8.0 31.7 71.9 81.2
Central America 44.8 31.8 16.3 7.1
4.2 15.0 37.6 73.8
Mexico 47.9 36.7 11.8 3.7
3.1 9.2 28.8 39.0
Other countries 38.2 35.5 15.0 11.3
13.1 50.1 66.6 69.6
Florida
Asia 27.9 27.6 21.5 23.0
12.7 57.7 80.6 91.5
Europe 19.8 20.8 12.1 47.3
11.1 44.0 58.6 84.1
Caribbean 22.1 25.8 20.4 31.7
10.5 40.0 64.5 87.8
South America 37.8 28.8 17.9 15.5
6.9 35.3 70.8 84.2
Central America 30.0 27.7 31.3 11.1
5.0 20.9 50.8 80.2
Mexico 45.7 2.7 14.8 6.8
3.4 12.9 35.1 53.8
Other countries 26.6 25.9 15.0 32.6
7.5 37.1 54.0 69.3
New York
Asia 26.4 31.9 24.7 16.8
12.0 52.2 77.9 90.4
Europe 15.1 27.9 12.5 44.6
12.1 62.5 69.4 86.3
Caribbean 17.9 28.1 26.6 27.4
16.5 43.1 65.2 81.1
South America 25.7 29.6 24.7 20.1
11.3 40.5 71.4 83.5
Central America 27.1 29.0 26.1 17.9
7.62 20.7 49.1 78.8
Mexico 40.7 38.0 16.2 5.2
2.1 8.7 27.4 50.8
Other countries 34.0 30.0 15.3 20.8
10.8 41.3 60.9 76.7
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2006-2008 American Community Survey (ACS), Table B05007.
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Table 3
STANDARDIZED RATES OF NATURALIZATION IN THE SOUTHEAST AND SELECTED STATES
TO CONTROL FOR GROUP DIFFERENCES IN LENGTH OF RESIDENCE IN THE U.S.*
Central South
Total Asian European Caribbean Mexican American American Other
U.S. total 38.7 53.6 48.2 44.7 21.0 29.3 42.1 42.3
Georgia 36.9 48.9 43.6 48.5 16.0 25.2 40.5 45.4
North Carolina 33.2 50.1 42.2 40.0 15.2 28.8 40.9 40.1
South Carolina 35.8 48.8 39.7 51.2 17.1 27.6 41.9 38.4
Tennessee 36.6 48.2 47.3 44.8 17.3 25.4 38.7 39.9
Florida 40.6 54.1 43.2 43.4 20.8 31.2 41.6 36.6
Virginia 44.2 54.4 44.3 49.7 22.5 26.8 38.9 46.8
Maryland 45.2 54.7 50.7 46.4 25.1 27.0 42.3 45.2
New York 45.5 51.3 52.4 45.4 16.9 31.4 44.7 41.5
New Jersey 45.1 53.0 48.8 47.0 17.8 29.1 40.7 49.5
Illinois 40.0 55.5 52.6 52.4 23.8 34.4 43.5 43.7
Michigan 45.6 54.1 48.7 44.2 23.9 31.0 44.8 37.7
California 36.9 55.7 48.0 44.3 21.8 28.8 43.4 44.6
Arizona 29.0 52.7 46.0 37.2 20.9 26.7 48.3 34.2
Nevada 34.3 53.2 43.1 43.6 22.3 29.5 45.2 39.8
Texas 29.2 53.0 42.1 42.4 20.7 26.3 41.1 44.3
* The calculation uses Georgia Asians’ percentage distribution in entry cohorts as the standard.
Source: Authors’ computations based on U.S. Census Bureau, 2006-2008 American Com mu -
nity Survey (ACS), Table B05007.
people in the pre-1980 entry cohort (43.3 percent, compared to only 19.6 percent of
Asians) and fewer in the post-2000 entry cohort (19.2 percent, compared to 27.4 percent
for Asians). However, by controlling for differences in entry cohort, the standardi-
za tion procedure shows that in the U.S. as a whole (and in most states) Asians
become naturalized U.S. citizens at a higher rate than Europeans, or than any other
group studied here –exceptions include New York, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania,
where Asians’ and Europeans’ naturalization rates are equal after entry cohort stan-
dardization. Georgia represents a slight exception to that pattern, in that after taking
entry cohort sizes into account, Asians and Caribbeans are tied for the highest nat-
uralization rate (both have standardized naturalization rates of just under 50 per-
cent). In other words, the actual higher percent of naturalized Caribbeans in Georgia
(58.6 percent in Table 1) is due to the fact that Georgia’s Caribbeans are more con-
centrated in earlier entry cohorts than Georgia’s Asians, not because of a higher pro -
clivity to naturalize.
In contrast, entry cohort standardization does not change the findings for Mex -
ican, Central American, South American, and Other naturalization levels, except to
reduce by a small amount the gap between them and Europeans. For the U.S. as a
whole, the southeastern states, and most other states, too, the rank order of their
percent naturalized is the same, with Mexicans consistently having the lowest rates,
usually by 6 to 12 percentage points.
DO NATURALIZED IMMIGRANTS AND/OR
NATURALIZATION RATES AFFECT U.S. POLITICS?
The prominence of immigration, especially “illegal immigrants,” as a hot current
political issue is obvious at local, state, and national levels. However, the place and
roles of immigrant U.S. citizens is a murkier matter, often passed over in public
debates or neglected by researchers. In earlier eras people spoke of “the immigrant
vote” and linked it to the success of the big urban political machines of bygone days.
But today, even as the percentage of immigrants in the U.S. population is almost as
high as it was in the heyday of machine politics, does it make sense to speak of “the
immigrant vote,” or for that matter, immigrants as a bloc of campaign donors, sup-
porters, or activists? Writing about southern and eastern European immigrants
decades ago, Banfield and Wilson (1963: 43) spoke of immigrant and second gener-
ation voters not wanting candidates who were “too” Jewish, Polish, or Italian; instead
they preferred “candidates who represent the ethnic group but at the same time dis-
play the attributes … the speech, dress, manner, and public virtues . . . of the upper-
class Anglo-Saxon.” Do similar preferences exist currently? Is an “Anglo-Saxon
model” still held in high regard, and, if so, does it doom foreign-born U.S. citizens
running for office if they too closely resemble the “immigrant/just-off-the-boat”
stereotype? Today, is it more analytically astute, or politically practical, to view nat-
uralized immigrants as a subset of larger pan-ethnic or ancestry groups (i.e., Mexican
immigrants merge into a larger Latino bloc or Mexican American bloc; immigrant
Jews fall into the Jewish American bloc or even larger “white” bloc), or is a view with
more nuance needed? What “model” of citizenship involvement (Plotke, 1999; Van
Hook, Brown, and Bean, 2006) is appropriate for immigrants (or most frequently cho-
sen by them), and does it differ from that of native-born citizens? These are broad
questions about immigrants and U.S. politics that we think ought to be addressed
by scholars. However, staying within the bounds of our data in this study, we focus
on a narrower but basic question: Do naturalized citizens and/or naturalization
rates affect U.S. politics? In this section we present some evidence on that issue,
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suggesting that immigrant naturalization rates and naturalized U.S. citizens do mat-
ter, sometimes in ways that are not obvious.
Immigrants in the U.S. Congress
To what extent have immigrant U.S. citizens made it into the halls of power? Are
there any in the U.S. Congress? Everyone knows that Congress has a Black Caucus
and a Hispanic Caucus, but is there an Immigrant Caucus? No, there is not; but if
one existed, how many people would be eligible for membership? After considerable
digging we learned that in the 2008-2010 (111st) Congress, no senators but eight
members of the House of Representatives are immigrants.5 They are Mazie Hirono
(Hawaii; from Japan), Ciro Rodriguez (Texas; from Mexico), Albio Sires (New Jersey;
from Cuba), David Wu (Oregon; from Taiwan), Anh “Joseph” Cao (Louisiana; from
Vietnam), Lincoln Díaz-Balart (Florida; from Cuba), Peter Hoekstra (Michigan;
from the Netherlands), and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (Florida; from Cuba).6 Except for
the two from Florida none represents a southeastern state. Interestingly, they are
evenly split across the two major political parties: the first four are Democrats and
the last four are Republicans. 
These legislators represent Congressional districts with wide demographic va ri -
ations. Only Díaz-Balart and Ros-Lehtinen are from majority immigrant districts.
Rodriguez represents a majority Mexican-American district, but only 15 percent is
immigrant. Sires’s district in New Jersey is about 40 percent immigrant, mainly from
several Latin American countries. Cao’s district is over 60 percent black; Hoekstra’s
is almost 90 percent white and less than 4 percent foreign-born; while Wu’s district is
80 percent white and 14 percent foreign-born. Hirono’s district in Hawaii is the most
diverse: a mix of white, multi-racial, and Filipino or Japanese backgrounds, none of
which comprises more than one-third of the district’s population. 
As a result of the most recent election (November 2010), the next Congress (for
2011-2012) will have fewer immigrants in the House of Representatives. Cao and
Rodriguez were defeated and Hoekstra did not run for re-election in his House dis-
5 Many would be considered “1.5 generation” since they were young when they came to the U.S.
6 Two voting members of the House, both Democrats representing New York, were born in Puerto Rico
(Jose Serrano and Nydia Velazquez), but technically they are not immigrants since people born in Puerto
Rico are U.S. citizens by birth (though those living in Puerto Rico lack the full set of rights and privileges
people born on the U.S. mainland have). Also, several members of Congress were born “overseas,” but are
not immigrants since they were U.S. citizens at birth because one or more of their parents were U.S. citi-
zens living abroad. Finally, a few people born abroad are non-voting members of Congress who represent
Puerto Rico or other U.S. overseas territories. 
trict (instead he ran as a candidate for Governor of Michigan, but lost in the Repu b-
lican primary). In addition, in August 2011, Representative Wu resigned from his
seat in Congress due to a scandal involving alleged sexual impropriety.
Almost all the foreign-born members of Congress have espoused issues relat-
ed to immigration. For example, Ciro Rodriguez is the vice-chairman of the House
Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security, and he has co-sponsored leg-
islation to increase funding for border security (e.g., Operation Stonegarden and
H.R. 6080). Lincoln Díaz-Balart has played a major role in reintroducing the Dream
Act. He has also sponsored the Immigrant Children’s Health Act, which calls for
health care coverage for immigrant children and pregnant women. Moreover, he has
received medals for working on the behalf of Nicaraguan and Colombian immi-
grants. Anh Joseph Cao is a member of the Committee on Homeland Security and
an advocate of refugees and affairs of his homeland (Vietnam). David Wu worked
on legislation for improved status for H-1B visa holders with advanced degrees.
Peter Hoekstra is a member of the Immigrant Reform Caucus and advocates secure
borders, the enforcement of existing law, accountability for breaking immigration
laws, and economic justice for hardworking Americans. Most recently, on Decem -
ber 8, 2010, the House of Representatives voted on the Dream Act and it passed by
a 216-to-198 vote. In general, Democrats supported this bill and Republicans were
against it, but it is interesting to see that three out of four immigrant Republicans in
the House (Cao, Ros-Lehtinen, and Díaz-Balart) voted in favor of it (Hoekstra voted
against). Three out of four immigrant Democrats in the House voted for the Dream
Act (Hirono, Rodriguez, Sires), while one (Wu) did not cast a vote on it. 
Electing Obama
There is good reason to be skeptical about the existence of “the immigrant vote,”
especially if it is thought of as a monolithic voting bloc aligned with a particular
candidate or party. Plotke (1999: 295) characterizes naturalized citizens as “centrist
and mildly pro-Democratic” and says they do not vote at high rates and are not united
by common political views. The even split between Democratic and Republican
immigrant members of Congress and Portes and Rumbaut’s (2006) discussion of
the very different political leanings of Mexican and Cuban immigrants show that
immigrant political orientations vary along dimensions of region, socioeconomic
level, degree of assimilation, and other factors. We also realize that naturalized for-
eign-born U.S. citizens comprise a small percentage of the U.S. population (5.3 per-
cent, and less than that in the Southeast), and the percentage that is registered to
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Table 4
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF PERCENTAGE OF STATE VOTERS CHOOSING 
BARACK OBAMA IN THE 2008 PRESIDENTIAL RACE
State median
Percent for Naturalization Percent South or household
Correlations Obama rate black non-South income
Percent voting for Obama
Naturalization rate1 .412**
Percent black in state .244* -.203
South or non-South2 -.177 -.350** .700**
Median household income .508** .420** -.080 -.352**
Percent foreign-born in state .491** .150 .054 -.140 .611**
1-tailed significance tests: * < .05 level; ** < .01 level
1 Naturalization rate = Percent of foreign-born residents in each state who are naturalized U.S.
citizens.
2 Southern states are coded 1; all other states are coded 0.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2006-2008 American Community Survey (ACS) and Leip (2008).
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR PERCENT 
IN EACH STATE THAT VOTED FOR BARACK OBAMA
Model 1 Model 2
b (unstandardized) B (standardized) b (unstandardized) B (standardized)
Variables coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient
Naturalization rate .382* .268 .433* .303
Percent black .590** .599 .563** .573
South -9.213* -.395 -9.134* -.392
Household income .403* .304 .142 .107
Percent foreign-born .544* .296
Constant 11.473 18.584
Adjusted R2 .435 .481
Note: Variables defined as above, except median household income is scaled in thousands of
dollars.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2006-2008 American Community Survey (ACS) and Leip (2008).
vote or actually votes is even smaller. Nevertheless, we were curious to see whether
a state’s percentage of naturalized immigrants was related in any way to the outcome
of the 2008 presidential election. We expected to find, at best, a weak relationship
–probably statistically insignificant– and therefore were surprised by the results,
presented in Table 4 and described below.
The percentage of the foreign-born population in a state who are naturalized
U.S. citizens has a significant positive correlation with the overall percentage of votes
cast for Barack Obama in the state (Pearson’s r = .41, probability = .003). In other words,
the higher the naturalization rate, the more the state leaned toward President Oba ma.
One must be cautious in interpreting ecological correlations of this type (Robinson,
1950); it does not necessarily mean that immigrants voted disproportionately for
Obama, since another variable might be the underlying cause of this statistical re -
sult, thereby rendering the observed correlation spurious. An obvious variable to
consider is the size of a state’s black population. Since blacks voted overwhelmingly
for Obama, if they comprise a large portion of a state’s population and if naturalized
immigrants tend to live in greater numbers in states with large black populations,
this might explain away our observed positive correlation between the naturaliza-
tion rate and the overall percent voting for Obama. We tested this by controlling for
states’ percentage of blacks; however, even with percent black controlled, the cor-
relation between states’ naturalization rate and states’ voters preferring Obama re -
mains significant, in fact it gets stronger (partial r = .49, p < .000).
Multiple regression analysis is a more efficient method of determining whether
the naturalization rate’s relationship with the percentage voting for Obama remains
significant after taking into account the influence of other variables. The results shown
in Table 4 indicate that the general trend of higher levels of support for Obama per-
sist even after controlling for percent black, for whether the state is located in the
South, and for the household income level in the state (model 1). The regression
analysis indicates that all four independent variables are significant and that states’
percent black has the strongest effect on the size of the vote for Obama. In addition,
being located in the South is associated with having a lower vote for Obama, while
both the percentage of foreign-born who have been naturalized and the median
household income in the state are related to higher percentages of votes for Obama.
Together these variables explain 43.5 percent of the variation in states’ percentage
voting for Obama. 
Model 2, in Table 4, takes it one step further, by adding an additional variable:
percentage of each state that is foreign-born. Doing this tests whether it is actually
the size of the foreign-born population in a state, rather than the percentage of the
foreign-born that has been naturalized, that affected the percentage of votes cast for
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Obama. The results show that percent foreign-born and the naturalization rate each
have significant independent effects on the size of the Obama vote: the higher the
percent foreign-born and the higher the naturalization rate, the larger the vote for
Obama. Interestingly, adding the percent foreign-born to the multiple regression
analysis causes the median household income to become an insignificant variable
(due to the fact that the correlation between percent foreign-born and states’ medi-
an household income is strong [r = .61]). Thus, the data suggest that Barack Obama
did better in states with higher percentages of naturalized immigrants, and this out-
come is not due to chance nor is it a spurious result produced by one of the other
variables included in the regression analysis.
The intriguing question is how to explain this relationship. What political and
sociological reasons or processes account for Obama doing better in 2008 in states
that have higher rates of naturalization?7 Since this outcome is unlikely to be due
solely to the voting patterns of naturalized immigrants, a broader explanation is
needed. Our explanation suggests a larger significance of immigrant citizens’ role
in U.S. politics.
As we explored the relationship between states’ naturalization rates and percen t -
age voting for Obama, two aspects of it became apparent. First, in states with very
low pro-Obama results (e.g., Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Texas, Utah, or Idaho), not
only was the percent naturalized low, but the foreign-born in these states were
largely from Mexico. In many people’s minds, this puts these immigrants in a ra cially
subordinate or suspect category and contributes to a climate in which a rhetoric re -
gar ding “bad immigrants” (i.e., who enter illegally, engage in crime, use too many pu b -
lic services, or do not want to adopt “American culture”) runs high in these states. 
Second –and in sharp contrast– states with high pro-Obama results fell into
two categories. One consists of generally liberal states in which the naturalization
rate is high, but immigrants are only a tiny portion of the state population and not
predominantly Mexican (e.g., Vermont, Maine, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin).
In this case, current immigration does not represent to most people a serious social
or economic threat, and the relatively small numbers of immigrants in these states
(most of whom have naturalized) probably represent, or are perceived in the pub-
lic’s mind as, “good immigrants” (those who successfully assimilated and became
incorporated into the civic culture and political community). The other set of states
with high pro-Obama results are those with large immigrant populations and a
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7 It will be interesting to see if there is any relationship between states’ naturalization rates and voting
results for candidates in the recent 2010 mid-term elections, in which Republicans were more successful
than Democrats. 
high percentage of naturalized foreign-born residents (e.g., Hawaii, New York, New
Jersey, Rhode Island, Illinois, and California). These are states with strong Demo cra-
tic Parties and a history of intense political competition among immigrant groups
coupled with a tradition of reaching out to diminish inter-group conflict and bringing
immigrant voters into a coalition, if only to compete successfully with the opposing
political party. In both cases, these experiences of naturalized immigrants contri b -
ute to a liberal pluralist narrative regarding immigration (i.e., the United States as
a nation of immigrants; immigrants perceived as fitting in and making positive con-
tributions), and a broader mindset emphasizing tolerance and faith in change and
diversity. Clearly, Barack Obama, in his 2008 presidential campaign, was able to tap
into and expand sentiments of this sort, and he became a very appealing candidate
to many people in these states with high naturalization rates. Thus, we suggest that
aside from which candidate naturalized immigrants vote for, who they are (i.e., race/
ethnicity/nationality), and the degree to which they have moved through the natu-
ralization process contributes something to the general political culture in a state.   
Some Anecdotal Evidence
Are the positions that an elected official takes on political issues affected by having
a growing number of naturalized foreign-born citizens living in the area he/she
represents? Although it is outside the Southeast, the case of Senator Harry Reid (D-
Nevada), the current Senate majority leader, suggests that it does. Back in 1993,
Senator Reid introduced the Immigration Stabilization Act (which subsequently
would not be enacted into law). This bill proposed to reduce legal immigration
from 800 000 to 300 000 per year, make it harder to obtain political asylum in the
U.S., speed up the deportation process, and end the policy of granting U.S. citizen-
ship to babies of women who were in the U.S. illegally at the time they give birth.
Senator Reid stated that illegal aliens were receiving welfare, food stamps, and
medical care without paying taxes and said, “Safeguards like welfare and free med-
ical care are in place to boost Americans in need of short-term assistance ... These
programs were not meant to entice freeloaders and scam artists from around the
world” (Ungar, 1998: 358-359). At that time, Senator Reid certainly did not seem like
a political leader sympathetic to immigrants, especially those who entered the U.S.
illegally. Today, his stance is much more sympathetic to this constituency. Senator
Reid has been a visible supporter of the Dream Act, and in September 2010, as
majority leader, he attached the Dream Act as an amendment to a major Department
of Defense appropriations bill –though it was defeated. 
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Some observers see Senator Reid’s policy change as an attempt to curry favor
among Latinos, who make up about 25 percent of Nevada’s population, whereas
back in 1990 it was 10.4 percent. Our research indicates that in 1990, foreign-born
people constituted just 9.6 percent of Nevada’s total population, and naturalized
foreign-born U.S. citizens only 3.6 percent. Data from the 2009 ACS show the growth
of these numbers: now 19.2 percent of Nevadans are foreign-born, and 7.6 percent
of the state’s population is naturalized U.S. citizens. Beyond the growing size of the
naturalized citizen constituency in his own state, in order to become a national
leader in the Democratic Party, Senator Reid probably had to shift his position to
accommodate and gain support from other leading Democratic politicians who
have taken a more liberal stance on immigration issues to gain immigrant electoral
support, or in hopes of attracting them to the Democratic Party in the future.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In summarizing our findings, we note that Georgia has many more naturalized
immigrants than North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee; however, both the
naturalization rate and the absolute number of naturalized citizens in these four
southeastern states are lower than other southern states with large immigrant pop-
ulations (e.g., Florida, Virginia, and Maryland), as well as states in the North and West
that are home to many immigrants. Naturalized immigrants in the Southeast also
comprise a very small portion of their respective states’ total populations (3 percent
in Georgia and less than 2 percent in the other southeastern states). One political
implication of these facts may be that naturalized immigrants will have a small impact
on political processes and outcomes in the Southeast, and perhaps that immigrants
in the Southeast are likely to be people talked about as objects to be “dealt with”
rather than active agents making or influencing decisions that affect their own fate.
However, we believe that some evidence from our research tells a different story
and hints at naturalized immigrants having more than the minimal role implied in
the preceding sentence.
For one thing, our findings suggest that the potential political strength of nat-
uralized Asian citizens in the Southeast (and the country as a whole) has been un -
recognized or under-estimated by researchers and media observers. For the most
part, the “face” of “the immigrant vote,” at least in the popular media, has been pre-
sented as Mexican or Latino. Yet, in the four Southeastern states we examined, there
are 221 482 naturalized Asians compared to only 56 935 naturalized Mexicans, and
130 043 naturalized people from Mexico plus Central and South America. Thus, in
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the Southeast, the number of U.S. citizens who are Asian immigrants and registered
or eligible to register to vote greatly outnumbers that of Latinos. Perhaps more
importantly, the same is true for the United States as a whole: there are almost 1.4
million more naturalized Asian citizens than naturalized citizens from Mexico, Central
and South America. Moreover, the rate at which Asians naturalize after being in the
U.S. more than ten years is well above that of groups from other parts of the world.
Thus, we expect their numbers to increase markedly in the next ten years.
In addition, the internal diversity of Asian immigrants puts them in a somewhat
unique position in the U.S. social structure, and generates two kinds of political
opportunities. Some immigrant Asian subgroups rank relatively high in socioeco-
nomic status, are residentially dispersed and integrated with other racial/ethnic
groups, and fairly well accepted by others, especially whites. These naturalized Asians
may have good chances of success in political activities (e.g., elections) since they
can appeal to a broad constituency beyond an immigrant base (as Congresspersons
Cao, Wu, and Hirono have done). In other places, research (Logan, Stults, and
Farley, 2004) shows that Asian residential segregation has increased over the past
20 years (e.g., Gwinnett County in suburban Atlanta and growing “Little Saigons”
in California and Boston). In these areas, depending upon how electoral district
boundaries are redrawn after reapportionment in 2011, it is likely that one or more
districts will have enough voters of Asian background, counting immigrants and
second generation, to enable a naturalized Asian candidate to win. With regard to
the impact of reapportionment, we also note that naturalized Asians are well rep-
resented in states with large population increases since 2000 (e.g., Texas, California,
Georgia, and North Carolina) that will receive an additional seat in the House of
Representatives and an additional electoral vote in presidential elections, which
could perhaps amplify the political voice of naturalized Asian U.S. citizens.
Of course, it would be a mistake to assume that naturalized Asians will form a
unified bloc speaking with a single political voice. The interests and concerns of Asian
Indian immigrants are likely to be different from those of the Hmong or Vietna m -
ese, to cite one example. Beyond that, the concerns and needs of Asian immigrants
may often diverge from those of immigrants of other nationalities, so it is probably
unrealistic to predict broad long-term coalitions among them. For instance, Zlolniski
(2006) shows the conflict of interest between Korean immigrant owners of office-
cleaning companies and the Mexican immigrant janitors they employ. Even on immi -
gration-related matters, some Asian groups will differ among themselves and with
non-Asians. For instance, some Asians (e.g., from India, Taiwan, or Malaysia) are much
more concerned about decisions related to H-1B visas than the wall being con-
structed on the U.S.-Mexico border, or with ICE arrests at construction sites or day-
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labor waiting areas. Some Asian immigrants do not favor the proposed Dream Act
or the idea of amnesty for immigrants in the U.S. illegally, viewing it as unfair to
those who immigrated legally.8 Our point is that a meaningful political role for nat-
uralized Asian U.S. citizens does not necessarily depend solely on being part of a
large mass immigrant voting bloc. Their potential political influence can be gener-
ated through their growing numbers, particularly in several key large or growing
states, but it also rests on the fact that many naturalized Asian immigrants are in
economic and educational categories associated with higher levels of political know -
ledge, efficacy, and participation, and their support and input may be especially
valuable in close elections. 
In conclusion, in this article we have shown and discussed important differ-
ences in naturalization rates among states and regions of the U.S. and among immi-
grant groups arriving from different parts of the world. Beyond that, we have
suggested several ways that naturalized citizens and naturalization rates are affect-
ing U.S. politics: showing the immigrant presence in Congress, analyzing the cor-
relation between states’ naturalization rates and the percentage that voted for
Barack Obama in 2008, and suggesting the potential political influence naturalized
Asian immigrants may have. We believe it is worth examining the 2010 mid-term
elections, as well as the 2012 presidential elections and political activity in the years
beyond to see whether naturalization rates in a state continue to affect voting pat-
terns, and how the role of immigrants in U.S. politics continues to unfold.
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